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Lowney: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROVING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN UNIVERSITY
EMPLOYMENT: TWO VIEWS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A.

INTRODUCTION

Last term, the Ninth Circuit decided two cases dealing with
sex discrimination in tenure review and promotion within a university faculty. Lynn v. Regents of the University of California l
provided the Ninth Circuit with its first opportunity to analyze
a claim of sex discrimination in university employment arising
under Title VII. 2 The court held that plaintiff Lynn had made
out a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that her right to
due process had been denied during the trial. The court therefore remanded the case for a new trial. s Laborde v. Regents of
the University of California, 4 decided four months after Lynn,
provided the Circuit's first application of Lynn. The Laborde
court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the University, holding that it was not clearly erroneous. II Since Lynn and
Laborde were nearly factually identical, their inconsistent holdings raise questions about how the Ninth Circuit will approach
and analyze future cases involving disparate treatment in university employment arising under Title VII.
1. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were
Ferguson, J. and Alarcon, J., concurring) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, Dec., 28, 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 53 (1982).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII § 702, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976). Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reads: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex . . . ."
3. The court specifically ruled that Lynn had made out a prima facie case of discrimination and remanded the case to determine Lynn's right to obtain her tenure
review file. 656 F.2d at 1344.
4. 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Choy,
J. and Kennedy, J.) (petition for rehearing denied; suggestion for rehearing en banc rejected. Ferguson, J., dissented from en banc vote).
5. 686 F.2d at 719. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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In 1969, Lynn was hired by the University of California at
Irvine as a lecturer.' After several extramural evaluations, she
was denied tenure and finally terminated in 1977.' Plaintiff
Laborde was hired as an assistant professor by the same University in 1965.' In 1970, she was granted tenure and was subsequently considered for promotion several times; each time being
denied rank beyond associate professor. 8 Both women brought
suit under Title VII, charging the University with sex discrimination. Lynn alleged discrimination regarding tenure evaluation;
Laborde discrimination in faculty promotion.

B.

BACKGROUND

Development of Title VII
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in employment on the basis of sex.l0 Although originally Title VII did
not apply to educational facilities,l1 in 1972, Congress removed
this exemption. III Congress passed the 1972 Act partly to draw
educational facilities within the ambit of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act18 and, more importantly, to strengthen the original legisla6. 656 F.2d at 1340. Lynn was promoted to the rank of untenured assistant professor in 1971, her last official promotion. Id.
7. Id. Although she was promoted in 1971, Lynn was denied a merit salary increase
that year due to an extramural evaluation which had judged her scholarship to be deficient. She was again adjudged to have deficient scholarship in her 1972-73 evaluation,
and again in her 1973-74 mid-career review. Because the University required that tenure
be attained within eight years of employment or termination would result, Lynn was
given a sabbatical during the 1974-75 academic year for the specific purpose of improving her scholarship. In 1975, tenure review commenced, resulting in the official denial of
tenure in 1976. Lynn then accepted a one year terminal appointment to 1977. Id.
8. 686 F.2d at 716. Laborde was awarded tenure and was promoted to the rank of
associate profeBSor in 1970. Id.
9. Id. Laborde was considered for promotion to full professor annually from 1973
through 1979. Although denied promotion to full professor, Laborde was given merit increases and attained the rank of associate professor, step V, which is one step below full
professor. Id. at 718.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). See supra note 2 for applicable language.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964)
(prior to 1972 amendment) read: "This title shall not apply to ... an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with
the educational activities of such institution."
12. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
103 (1972). This act removed secular educational facilities from Title VII's original exemption. Religious facilities are still exempt from Title VII compliance.
13. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d SeBS. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154-55 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 238) reads in part:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor
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tion.14 Seven years after the passage of the 1964 Act, Congress
found that substantial discrimination in employment remained. 1II That sex discrimination persisted was especially objectionable to Congress since it was explicitly prohibited by Title
VII. IS By passing the 1972 Act, Congress emphasized that sex
discrimination in employment was illegal and that educational
facilities were not exempt from Title VII compliance. 17
Courts have further refined the objectives and philosophy of
Title VII. IS In Griggs v. Duke Power Plant,19 the Supreme Court
expressed the congressional policies of Title VII in these terms:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to
guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he
does any national policy suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational employees-primarily teachers-from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against minorities and women in the field of education is as pervasive as
discrimination in any other area of employment .... Similarly, in the area of sex discrimination, women have long been
invited to participate as students ... but without the prospect of gaining employment as serious scholars.
The report observed that because students are influenced by ideas imparted in school,
discrimination there would promote in them discriminatory attitudes. [d. at 2155.
14. [d. at 2139, reads in part: "Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of
equal employment opportunity for all citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is not adequate."
15. Id. "Despite the progress which has been made since the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 discrimination against minorities and women continues." Id.
16. Id. at 2140. Congress found that women were subjected to economic deprivation
on a class-wide basis. Numerous studies indicated that women were consistantly put in
less challenging and therefore less renumerative positions solely on the basis of their sex.
17. Id. at 2141. "Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of
prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the Banle degree of social concern
given to any type of unlawful discrimination." Id.
18. See generally International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 348-49 (1977) (primary purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments . . . . Congress proscribed not only
overt discrimination, but practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation."); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (primary objective of the
Equal Employment Opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act was to achieve equality of employment opportunity and remove barriers that had operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group over another); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (overriding
purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to remove the daily affront and humiliation
involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general
public).
19. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification. 20

In sum, it is the High Court's view that Congress' purpose in
enacting Title VII was to eradicate discriminatory barriers to
employment.
The McDonnell Douglas Test and its Adaptations

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green,21 the Court outlined
the procedure and allocation of proof in a Title VII suit. This
test has become the prevailing approach in Title VII actions. 22
The first step requires the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of
discrimination by proving four elements:
1) that he or she belongs to a racial minority,
2) that he or she applied and wa~ qualified for the job the
employer was advertising,
20. [d. at 430-31. Griggs was a class action suit by blacks alleging that the company's requirement of having a high school education or passing a standardized test violated Title VII. The Court held that when such tests are not related to job performance,
Title VII prohibits them. Although Griggs dealt with disparate impact under Title VII,
its interpretation of Title VII's goals is cited with approval in disparate treatment cases
as well. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff in this case, a black mechanic, alleged that he
was refused employment as a re-hire because of his involvement in civil rights activities.
The issue was whether he had demonstrated that he had been impermissibly discriminated against. The Court held that he had. [d. at 802.
22. See generally Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982) (using the
McDonnell Douglas test to determine if the Army violated Title VII provisions by passing over a female for a promotion as a supervisory chemist); Lindsey v. Mississippi Research & Dev. Center, 652 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1981) (using the McDonnell Douglas test to
analyze a claim of race discrimination in employment); Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d
1003 (lst Cir. 1979) (concluding that principles of the McDonnell Douglas test can be
applied to age discrimination arising under A.D.E.A.); Scott v. Univ. of Delaware, 601
F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979) (using McDonnell Douglas test to determine if black professor was
discriminated against when his university contract was not reviewed); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (utilizing McDonnell Douglas test to determine if employer
violated Title VII by sexually harassing female employee). But see Note, Labor LawCivil Rights Act of 1964-Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 15
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 654 (1974) (Supreme Court has made it more difficult for
Title VII plaintiffs to successfully prove discriminatory employment practices).
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3) that he or she was refused employment despite his or
her qualifications, and
4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with
plaintiff's qualifications. 23
These elements and the evidence required to satisfy them are
not to be taken as a rigid formula.24 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Court stated that the
important criteria are not the discrete elements which make up
the first step of this test but whether plaintiff has shown by
competent evidence that the employer's refusal to hire him or
her created an inference that the decision was based on unlawful
discrimination. all
Therefore, while plaintiff must generally show each of the
four elements in step one to show prima facie discrimination,
the evidence which plaintiff must present is not rigidly applied
to anyone element. Rather, the evidence is fluidly applied to all
four elements of the prima facie showing. What the plaintiff
must show is that he or she was in fact discriminated against. aa
Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
refusing to hire plaintiff.n Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeneya8 demonstrates that this burden can be met
easily. The Sweeney Court stated that the defendant need not
prove the absence of a discriminatory motive, but only state a
23. 411 U.S. at 802.
24. The Court in McDonnell Douglas cautioned that because the facta will vary with
each Title VII case, the factors may not fit tightly in every respect. Id. at 802 n.13.
25. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In International Brotherhood, the United States sued the
Teamsters Union for alleged violations of Title VII, specifically that their seniority system effectively locked out non-whites, thereby leaving them with the local truck routes.
The Court held that the United States had sustained ita burden of showing discrimination. Id. at 358.
26. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court
stated that the burden of establishing a prima facie case should not be onerous. Id. at
253. Similarly, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court stated
that in order for plaintiff to go forward with the evidence, he or she must show that the
actions of the employer make it more likely than not that such actions were discriminatory. Id. at 576.
27. 411 U.S. 792, 807.
28. 439 U.S. 24 (1978). In Sweeney, a female college professor sought to have her
promotion backdated to the date of her first attempt to obtain a promotion, alleging that
the first· attempt and denial was based upon sex discrimination. Sweeney v. Board of
Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 171 (1978).
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legitimate reason for refusing to hire plaintiff. 29 Once so stated,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff.30 The final step of the
test requires plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 31
The McDonnell Douglas test was developed in the context
of racial discrimination in employment. 3:1 Subsequent cases have
applied the test to discrimination in academia. 33 In Smith v.
University of North Carolina,34 the Fourth Circuit applied the
McDonnell Douglas test and adapted it specifically to sex discrimination in a university setting. The Smith approach requires
a plaintiff to establish prima facie discrimination by showing
that:
1) he or she was a member of a class protected by Title
29. 439 U.S. at 25. The Court in Burdine made it clear that the defendant must
present some evidence to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing. "It is sufficient that
defendant's evidence raises a genuine iBBue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff." 450 U.S. 248, 254-55.
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802. It should be pointed out that throughout
the Title VII suit, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to show that he or she was
discriminated against. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 428
(1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1979);
See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (burden of persuasion never shifts).
31. 411 U.S. at 804. McDonnell Douglas listed various factors which could show by
competent evidence that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Id. at 804 n.18. Because of the relatively easy burden a plaintiff has in step one-the
prima facie showing-and the extremely light burden an employer has in articulating a
legitimate reason, the major iBBue in Title VII disparate treatment cases revolves around
plaintiff being able to show pretext on the part of the employer.
32. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 13.
33. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (female college
physical education teacher sued under Title VII. Court required school to grant her tenure and promotion); Whiting v. Jackson St. Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (white
teacher at predominantly black school made out prima facie showing using civil rights
laws); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (female teacher not
required to prove abuse of discretion by university in Title VII suit); Sweeney v. Board
of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1045 (1980) (female teacher proved that reasons advanced by University for not promoting her were a pretext for discrimination); Davis v. Weiner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979)
(model established by McDonnell Douglas was applicable where a female professor alleged termination of her position was based on sex).
34. 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980). In Smith, a female teacher was denied promotion
and reappointment at the University. She brought suit alleging sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII and charged that the University's articulated reason was a pretext
for discrimination. The court of appeals held that the reasons offered by the University
were not pretextual. Id. at 344.
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VII.
2) he or she was qualified for the promotion or rank
sought,
3) he or she was denied promotion or reappointment,
4) in cases of reappointment or tenure, members of the opposite sex with similar qualifications achieved the rank
or position sought. 811
Smith left intact the second and third steps of the McDonnell
Douglas test. 88

C.

THE

Lynn

DECISION

In Lynn, the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the McDonnell Douglas test as applied by Smith to sex discrimination in
an educational facility.87 The Lynn court concluded that the district court erred in holding that Lynn failed to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination. 88 The court found that Lynn established a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating
that: (1) she belonged to a class protected by Title VII, (2) she
was denied tenure,89 (3) she met the objective criteria for tenure,
and (4) males with qualifications similar to her own were
granted tenure. 40 The court found Lynn's presentation of specific statistical data helpful in establishing her prima facie
case. 4 •
35. 632 F.2d at 340.
36. Id. In effect therefore, Smith modified only the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas test, the prima facie showing. But in doing 80, Smith made the test slightly
stricter by requiring plaintiff to show that a nonprotected class member (male) got a
similar position.
37. 656 F.2d 1337, 134l. The court noted that this adapted test could also be used to
attack racial discrimination in university employment decisions and in areas other than
tenure review or promotion such as the initial hiring determination. Id. at 1341 n.2.
38. Id. at 1342. The court pointed out that the district court had "held, without
discussing the four elements that establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
and Smith, that Lynn had failed to make the required showing." Id.
39. Id. The court did not describe why she met elements one and three. It merely
stated that "[L)ynn obviously satisfied elements (1) and (3) of the McDonnell Douglas
test as applied by Smith in the academic context." Id.
40. Id. Lynn presented specific statistical data which showed that she had the same
education, experience, and number of published works 88 others who had been granted
tenure. This data, the court found, was evidence that she met the objective criteria for
tenure-the second element of the prima facie showing.
41. Id. The court found that the reliance on this type of data during the prima facie
showing was both practical and sound. The court noted that the ultimate issue in cases
like this is whether the tenure decision was based on merit or sex. Even though statisti·
cal data only provides indirect evidence of discrimination, it nonetheleBB is an effective
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In addition, Lynn showed by using general statistical data,
that the University engaged in an overall pattern of sex discrimination. n This data was useful because of the highly subjective
nature of the tenure review process. 48 The court found that ,statistics could be used to show it more likely than not that" the
University's decision to deny Lynn tenure was based on sex.
The court found that the University's attitude toward
Lynn's scholarship was due, in part, to her choice of subject
matter-women's issues in French literature. The University
considered this to be an insubstantial topic for scholarly work. 44
The court found such disdain evidence of a discriminatory attitude toward women. 411 This evidence helped Lynn establish her
prima facie' case independent of the four elements required by
McDonnell Douglas. 4a
Turning to the issue of whether the University articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to rebut Lynn's prima facie
case, the court acknowledged that all the University need do was
present a genuine issue of fact that it did not discriminate on
the basis of sex. 47 The University gave as its reason that Lynn
had been warned repeatedly of her deficient scholarship. Given
tool due to the scant evidence available in a aex discrimination suit. This then allowed
the court to effectively discharge its duty under Title VII. Id. at 1342 n.3.
42. The court reprinted an excerpt from the district court's opinion which pointed
out that even with an on-campus affirmative action program, U.C. Irvine still was not
effectively utilizing these groups. In fact, the district court noted that since the University was founded, it had only granted tenure to two women as compared to twenty-six
men. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 313, 314-15 (1979).
43. "Statistical evidence does not deal with the merits of the University's tenure
decision, which necessarily involves academic judgments." 656 F.2d at 1342 n.3.
44. Lynn's research of French literature concentrated primarily on the influence
women had on its development. Id. at 1343 n.4.
45. The court expressly rejected the district court's rationale that since the University would have objected if a man had pursued Lynn's study of women in French literature, there was no sex discrimination. "A disdain for women's issues, and a diminished
opinion of those who concentrate on those issues, is evidence of a discriminatory attitude
towards women." Id. at 1343. See also 656 F.2d at 1343 n.5, infra text accompanying
note 77.
46. The court noted that "the existence of a discriminatory attitude, like general
statistical data, tends to establish . . . that the University's decision was based on an
impermissible criterion, and therefore tends to establish Lynn's prima facie case." Id. at
1343.
47. Id. at 1344. In a footnote, the court concluded that to require the University to
prove more in the second step of the test would make the third step superfluous. Id. at
1344 n.6. See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24
n.1 (1978).
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the ease with which this step of the McDonnell Douglas test can
be met, the court concluded that this reason met the burden required to rebut Lynn's prima facie case. 48
The court found that this type of subjective criteria-the
University's opInIOn that Lynn's scholarship was deficient-should not be considered during the prima facie showing.
Rather, at the initial stage, it is best to consider only objective
data. 48 To include both objective and subjective data in the
prima facie showing would reduce the three step test of McDonnell Douglas to one step in which all issues of the Title VII suit
would be resolved. &0 This would require the court to substitute
its own evaluation of faculty performance, a task the court is not
suited to perform. &1 Regardless of when the data is introduced,
the court found that Lynn's burden remained the same: to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the University unlawfully discriminated against her.&S
The Lynn court did not .rule on the merits of the third step
of the McDonnell Douglas test. as Instead, the court turned to
the trial proceedings and concluded that the district court violated Lynn's due process rights by denying her request to see
her tenure review file (the majority report).&4 The University
had submitted the majority report to the trial judge for an in
48. 656 F.2d at 1344. The court stated that this burden is very easy to meet in the
academic context. See Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
49. 656 F.2d at 1344. The court found that objective job criteria should be presented
at step one, the prima facie showing. Subjective criteria, along with any supporting evidence indicating discrimination, is best dealt with later in the proceedings. Id.
50. Id. at 1344. The court found that this would defeat the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test. Id.
51. Id. The court found that the three step approach of McDonnell Douglas enabled
it to discern whether the objective criteria was applied to the plaintiff in a discriminatory
manner. Id. at 1345 n.8.
52. 656 F.2d at 1345. The court noted that on the practical level, at what point
subjective evidence is introduced should not make any difference in the final outcome of
the suit. If plaintiff offered the evidence when showing prima facie discrimination, the
criteria would have to be inherently discriminatory; if plaintiff offered it during the second step, she would have to show the ctiteria was a pretext for discrimination in the
third step. Id.
53. 656 F.2d at 1345.
54. Id. at 1346. Lynn's primary contention throughout the appellate proceeding was
that she was entitled to view the tenure review file and that her inability to see it prevented her from adequately proving Title VII discrimination. Id. at 1345 n.10. The tenure review file was the report of the majority of the evaluators. The minority report
consisted of those evaluators who disagreed with the majority.
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camera inspection to determine whether its contents should remain privileged. lUI The file was introduced to counterbalance the
effect of Lynn's introduction into evidence of the minority report. 1I8 The court concluded that the district court's use of the
majority report required that Lynn be able to see the report as
well since it was relevant to all the parties. 1I7 Therefore, the district court committed reversible error by viewing the majority
report while denying Lynn the opportunity to review it. liS

The appellate court then offered guidelines to the district
court in resolving the issue of privilege of tenure review files,
specifically peer evaluations in Title VII suits. 1I9 The court stated
that the University's interest in confidentiality-the need to
maintain the effectiveness of the tenure review process-should
be balanced against plaintiff's need to obtain evidence to aid in
establishing prima facie discrimination. 80 The importance of enabling plaintiffs to prove discrimination, the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of discrimination, and the strong national policy against discrimination in educational facilities are
factors which should be considered in balancing these two interests. 81 The court then adopted the view expressed by the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits in resolving this question-that when peer
evaluations serve as the alleged basis for the tenure decision,
plaintiff's need to see the evaluations outweighs the University's
55. [d. at 1346. The University's position was that the file was never submitted,
accepted, or used as evidence by the trial judge and therefore Lynn had no right to view
its contents. [d. at 1346 n.ll.
56. Counsel for the University had stated that "we feel for purposes of your [the
judge's) making a complete review that you ought to be provided with the [majority
report) .... " [d. at 1346.
57. [d.
58. [d. The court stressed that the judicial process was based upon the need for
informed and vigorous argument by all concerned parties during litigation. The district
court's refusal to let Lynn see the majority report violated this principle. [d.
59. [d. The court explicitly stated that it would not decide this issue at the present
time. These guidelines were intended to help the district court resolve the issue of
Lynn's right to obtain the majority report since they would be required to consider the
issue upon remand. [d.
60. [d. at 1347. The court also mentioned that the evidence used by plaintiff to show
prima facie discrimination may be relevant to steps two and three of the McDonnell
Douglas test and vice versa. For example, statistical data may be helpful in establishing
discriminatory application of objective job criteria at step three of the test as well as
helping plaintiff establish her prima facie case at step one. [d. at 1346 n.13; See also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 805.
61. 656 F.2d at 1347.
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need for confidentiality.8!
The court noted that because the University had allowed
Lynn to see other information in her file, the University had far
less interest in maintaining the confidentiality of Lynn's tenure
review file than it normally would. 88 The court concluded that
on remand, the district court should reach its decision regarding
her file in light of the strong interest she continued to have in
proving Title VII discrimination.a.
D.

THE

Laborde

DECISION

In Laborde, the Ninth Circuit applied the approach adopted
by Lynn in a Title VII case. The court found that Laborde, a
tenured associate professor, had made out a prima facie showing
of discrimination. 8& However, the trial court further ruled that
Laborde had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the University's reason for denying her promotion to
full professor was a pretext for discrimination.s8 The Ninth Circuit concluded that this ruling was not clearly erroneous, and
therefore affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the
University.8?
62. Id. See Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d at 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (when
University defends sex discrimination claim on unbiased faculty evaluations, plaintiff is
entitled to see them); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) (court denied plaintiff's request to see entire faculty's review
file to establish prima facie case, noting that had the University sought to justify any
male-female disparity based on these files, the plaintiff should be allowed to see them).
63. 656 F.2d at 1348. Pursuant to University regulations, Lynn had a summary of
the evaluator's comments. Furthermore, she had obtained the names of her evaluators
through a fellow faculty member. In addition, Lynn had letters written by members of
the review committee as well as testimony of the chair. As a result, the confidentiality of
the majority report had been severely eroded even though Lynn did not know which
evaluator made which specific comment. Id.
64. Id. at 1348. The court also cautioned that the district court should decide the
issue of Lynn's right to see the majority report without considering the report's contents
via an in camera inspection. Id. at n.20. While agreeing with the result, Judge Alarcon
would not have ruled specifically on the question of when a plaintiff in a Title VII action
should be allowed to breach the confidentiality of the evaluations. Id. at 1348-49.
65. 686 F.2d 715, 717. This showing was met using the McDonnell Douglas test as
modified by Smith and adopted by Lynn. The court merely restated the four elements
required to show prima facie discrimination, and without discussion, held that Laborde
had met them.
66. Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 495 F. Supp. 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal.
1980).
67. 686 F.2d at 719.
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The opinion outlined the Lynn approach6s and affirmed the
use of statistical data when a plaintiff seeks to establish discrimination under Title VII.6e The court found that this evidence
raised an inference that the University was engaged in a pattern
of sex discrimination. But the court cautioned that although relevant to the showing of prima facie discrimination, such data
may not by itself be sufficient to raise the requisite inference. 7o
The court stated that the University's articulated reason for not
promoting Laborde was legitimate and nondiscriminatory.71 The
opinion stressed that by affirming the lower court's ruling, it was
not adopting the University's position regarding Laborde's
scholarship. Rather, the court applied the clearly erroneous
standard to the lower court's ruling and found no error.72

E.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Lynn court, while adapting the McDonnell Douglas test
68. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
69. 686 F.2d at 718.
70. Id. In addition, the plaintiff must show that she met the minimum objective
qualifications for the position. The court re880ned that Laborde met this by virtue of her
having been considered for promotion. The court added that statistical data may also
help meet this requirement. Id.
71. Id. Although Laborde had published several books and articles, along with other
scholarly works, the University chose to promote her to the next level within the rank of
88sociate professor, stating that she did not possess the scholarship required for promotion to full profeBSor. This decision occurred despite the fact that a majority of her
evaluators supported her promotion to full professor. Notwithstanding this evidence and
the University's pattern of sex discrimination, the trial court found that Laborde had not
rebutted the University's re880n for denying her promotion to full professor. 495 F.
Supp. 1067, 1073.
72. 686 F.2d at 718. In addition, the court found that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion when he denied Laborde's request to inspect the University's peer review
file. The motion W88 made shortly before trial and should have been made during the
discovery proceedings. Id. at 719.
Judge Ferguson, a member of the Lynn panel, dissented from the vote to deny rehearing en banc, 88serting that Laborde presented the "the strongest possible C88e" that
she W88 the victim of sex discrimination:
The opinion states in clear language that men with qualifications similar to her's have been promoted to full profeBSor
positions.
Yet the opinion concludes that she is not entitled to promotion because she failed to meet the University's standards
for scholarship and research.
The logical conclusion of that analysis is that men who do
not meet the standards of scholarship and research will be
promoted but women will not unless they meet the standards.
Title VII prohibits that type of discrimination.
Id. at 720.
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to sex discrimination in universities, applied only the first two
steps. However, while not directly ruling on the issue of pretext,
the court did develop an approach which may prove useful in
resolving this issue in future cases. The court noted that some of
the evidence which plaintiff Lynn presented for purposes of establishing prima facie discrimination could be used in showing
that the University's reasons were pretextual or discriminatory
in their application. 78
The court also stated that the University's disdain for
women's studies was evidence of a discriminatory attitude toward women.7f It therefore follows that the court, had it reached
the issue of pretext, would probably have found that the University's reason for denying Lynn tenure-her deficient scholarship-was a pretext for discrimination. However, because the
court did not specifically rule on this issue-the key issue in a
Title VII action-Lynn provided no precedent upon which future courts could base their resolution of the pretext issue.
Not being bound by Lynn on the issue of pretext, the
Laborde court approached this issue cautiously. The court chose
not to rule on or even discuss the merits of the University's decision not to promote Laborde. 711 Instead, the court deferred to the
findings of the trial court.
Both cases were reluctant to apply the final step of the McDonnell Douglas test, concluding that it would be prudent to
allow the trier of fact to decide the issue of pretext. This approach is consistant with the nature and objectives of appellate
review to exercise deference to the trial court's findings of fact.
However, the opinions differed as to the appropriate degree of
judicial restraint in Title VII sex discrimination actions.
The court in Laborde did not review the merits of the University's decision, restricting itself to considering whether the
trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. 7S In Lynn, however,
while realizing the need for restraint, the court nonetheless admonished trial courts not to ignore the mandate of Title VII
73. 656 F.2d at 1346 n.13.
74. Id. at 1343 n.5.
75. 686 F.2d at 719.
76.Id.
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We are sensitive to the problems related to judicial examination of issues like the importance of
women's studies, and to the need for courts to refrain from substituting their judgment for that of
educators in areas affecting the content of curricula. Accordingly, the view we express is a narrow
one. We are saying only what Title VII commands: when plaintiffs establish that decisions regarding academic employment are motivated by
discriminatory attitudes relating to race or sex, or
are rooted in concepts which reflect such discriminatory attitudes, however subtly, courts are obligated to afford the relief provided by Title VIp?

Thus, the Lynn court recognized that sex discrimination is often
deeply rooted in our traditional values and therefore is subtle
and difficult to detect. However, this very reason serves to make
the court's job of determining the true reason for employment
decisions all the more exacting. 78

Lynn's approach is more appropriate for determining
whether University employment practices violate Title VII than
the deferential approach of Laborde. Lynn recognized that Universities have a dual role-that of educator and that of employer. Decisions concerning academic employment may therefore reflect valid academic concerns but may also be the product
of discrimination. However, district court findings which give
deference to the University's asserted academic reason will not
reveal whether or not such decisions were based on a permissible
reason. Lynn therefore recognized that even though a University
may have a legitimate reason for its employment decisions, a
more exacting inquiry is needed to separate discriminatory employment decisions from those resting on valid academic criteria.

F.

CONCLUSION

The courts in both Lynn and Laborde correctly asserted
that as a general matter, it is unwise to involve the judiciary in
decisions of curricula. However, when a man or a woman is de77. 656 F.2d at 1343 n.S (emphasis added).
78. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/9

14

Lowney: Constitutional Law

1983]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

153

nied tenure or promotion solely on the basis of his or her sex,
this is not a curriculum decision. It is an employment decision
and should be scrutinized as thoroughly as Congress intended all
employment decisions to be scrutinized. 79 By recognizing this,
the Lynn court more faithfully upheld the spirit of Title VII's
goal-the removal of any and all barriers which serve to classify
employees on impermissible grounds. Laborde's reticence to look
beneath the surface of university employment decisions reduces
Title VII's impact in academia to a level approaching impotence.
In order that Title VII be effective in eliminating sex discrimination in Universities, the Ninth Circuit should undertake the
exacting inquiry of employment decisions as contemplated by
Lynn to review trial court findings of the reasons behind such
decisions.

Robert Lowney*

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. BELIEF IN "MARK OF THE BEAST" PROTECTED BY FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
In Callahan v. Woods,l the Ninth Circuit held that a belief
that social security numbers are the "mark of the beast" was
plainly religious within the meaning of the free exercise clause of
the Constitution, and therefore the government must show a
compelling interest in making social security numbers a prerequisite for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
benefits.
While plaintiff was in prison, he developed a strong interest
in religion and since then, had read the Bible daily and become
a member of the Baptist Church. 2 Following his release from
prison, plaintiff was unemployed and his family became eligible
79. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 13.
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Adams, C. J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Goodwin, and Farris, JJ.) (rehearing denied, Jan. 19, 1982).
2. [d. at 682.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9

154 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:153

to receive AFDC benefits. Later, the county notified him that his
younger daughter was no longer eligible for benefits because
plaintiff would not obtain a social security number for her.s He
refused to do so because he believed social security numbers to
be the "mark of the beast and the sign of the Antichrist who
threatens to control the world."· He believed that to accept a
number was to "serve the beast."11 Plaintiff acknowledged that
his aversion to social security and other personal identification
numbers predated his interest in religion. 6 Nonetheless, he asserted that his objection was religious in nature and that the
Revelation text of the Bible articulates a concept that he felt in
a more inchoate form before his religious study.7
The sole issue which the Ninth Circuit addressed was
whether plaintiff's belief was protected by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. 8 To merit protection under the
free exercise clause, a religious claim must satisfy two basic criteria. First, the claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely
held; second, the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in
"purely secular" philosophical concerns." The Ninth Circuit
noted that the district court's application of that test was am3. [d. at 681. In requiring a social security number for AFDC eligibility, the State of
California acted pursuant to the mandate of section 602(a)(25) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1976).
4. 658 F.2d at 682.
5. [d. Plaintiff cited the New Testament Book of Revelation 13, which reads in part:
16. [Hle causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free
and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their
foreheads;
17. And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the
mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name;
18. Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count
the number of the beast: for it is the number of a man; and his
number is Six hundred three-score and six.
658 F.2d at 682.
6. 658 F.2d at 682. Plaintiff first developed his aversion to social security and other
personal identification numbers during his 13-year prison term at San Quentin. In the
last few years of his term, he began studying the Bible and thereafter developed his
strong interest in religion. [d.
7. [d. Plaintiff, his wife and older child all had social security numbers. However,
plaintiff believed than on behalf of his younger daughter, he must observe his religious
objection to 888igning numbers and preserve her freedom to avoid serving the beast, even
though she may decide later to obtain a number voluntarily.
8. The free exercise clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...... U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
9. 658 F.2d at 683.
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biguous since the lower court found that while plaintiff was sincere in his objection to identification numbers, his objection was
not "rooted in religious belief. "10 The appellate panel explained,
however, that "[a] First Amendment inquiry into sincerity generally has a different focus, addressing the sincerity with which
the claimant holds the allegedly religious belief itself."l1 Thus,
the court concluded that "construed properly the trial court's
blanket finding of sincerity must mean that the plaintiff, when
he says that he opposes personal identification numbers because
they are the 'mark of the beast' ... sincerely believes in the
diabolical nature of those numbers."12
Next, the panel addressed the question of whether plaintiff's objections were "rooted in" a religious belief. First, it explained that the religious belief must be relevant to the claim. IS
The court found that the relevance of plaintiff's beliefs to his
claim was apparent; it was difficult to imagine how a sincere belief that numbers are the "mark of the beast" could be considered irrelevant to his stand against the assignment of a number
to his daughter. a The panel noted the trial court had found that
plaintiff's objection to identification numbers, although sincere,
was actually "rooted in secular and philosophical concerns" and
had emphasized that since plaintiff's aversion to identification
numbers significantly predated his religious beliefs, his long
prison experience was "the major impetus to his belief."UI The
Ninth Circuit found that this reasoning suggested a fallacious
premise that a long-held secular belief invalidates first amendment protection for a related but newly alleged religious belief.
The court also made clear that a claimant's belief need not be of
10. Callahan v. Woods, 479 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
11. 658 F.2d at 683.
12.Id.
13. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder involved claims by Amish
parents who refused to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade despite a
state law requiring attendance until age 16. Claimants argued that further education
would violate their religious beliefs because the values taught in public high schools
clashed with the Amish values and way of life. The Supreme Court found that the Amish
way of life is an essential part of their religious beliefs and practices, and that secondary
education would tend to severely infringe upon claimants' religious beliefs. Id. at 215-16.
14. 658 F.2d at 683.
15. Id. at 684. The district court stated: "Plaintiff's beliefs arose in a purely secular
context, uninformed by religious training or inspiration. Under such circumstances, the
First Amendment does not shield plaintiff from the legitimate commands of the government." 479 F. Supp. at 625 n.6.
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religious origin in order to warrant first amendment protection.
The correct standard is not whether plaintiff's beliefs have always been religious, but only whether they are religious in the
context of his life as he now lives it. 16
The court also noted that a coincidence of secular and religious claims in no way extinguishes the weight to be accorded
the religious one. It distinguished between beliefs based on
"purely secular considerations," which merit no first amendment
protection, and those based on "purely religious" claims, which
merit the full scope of first amendment protection. According to
the court, the "area of overlap is presumably protected."17
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that widespread acceptance
of a claimant's views on his or her religion is not required in
order to merit first amendment protection. "In applying the free
exercise clause ... courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a claimant's religious beliefs."18 While
plaintiff's interpretation of the scripture may differ from the
meaning most members of his church find in that text, the court
reasoned that such disagreement cannot invalidate his free exercise right. Ie The court explained that it is not within the judicial
function and competence to inquire whether a claimant or his
fellow church members more correctly perceives the commands
of their faith.so Unless the "claim is so bizarre or so unrelated to
the religious nature of the text that it is 'clearly nonreligious in
motivation'," a claimant's interpretation cannot be disregarded
16. 658 F.2d 8t 684. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
17. 658 F.2d at 684.
18. 1d. at 685.
19. Other individuals have also interpreted the Revelation text to mean that social
security numbers are the "mark of the beast". In Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), plaintiffs, while seeking AFDC benefits for their children, objected to
the issuance of social security numbers as a prerequisite to eligibility. They believed that
these numbers were becoming the universal identification number predicted in the Book
of Revelation as the tool used by the Antichrist to control individuals. In noting that
neither widespread adherence nor scriptural support is a prerequisite to constitutionally
protected status for a purportedly religious claim, the court nevertheless traced the history of the Jewish and Christian concepts of the Antichrist and found that "[tJhe meaning of the m~rk to theologians-whatever they believe the mark to have been-is strikingly similar to the meaning for the Stevenses, who see a potential for abuse of the
spiritual side of humanity in a number which could act as a universal identifier." 1d. at
905.
20. 658 F.2d at 686. See Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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as non-religious/oil
The Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiff had met both requirements of the threshold test for his free exercise claim. The
court remanded the case to the district court to determine the
extent to which plaintiff's' protected belief is burdened by the
government's requirement, and whether the government is following the "least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
. interest."22
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, a religious belief which
is partly secular and partly religious is presumed protected by
the first amendment. This presumption can be overcome by a
showing of "non-religious motivation."2s This decision indicates
that the Ninth Circuit will continue to deal with first amendment religion claims on a case-by-case basis and will inquire into
the often difficult matters of a claimant's motive and honesty-infact. The court expressed its commitment to lending the full
scope of first amendment protection to claims based on religious
beliefs, but warned that under suspicious circumstances, it will
consider all of the attendant circumstances underlying the
claimant's motive for asserting such claims. 24

B.

ATrORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES: WHO IS A "PREVAILING PARTY"?

In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water/III the
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs, alleging gender discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,28 were entitled to
21. 658 F.2d at 686.
22. [d. at 687, quoting Thomas, supra note 20, at 718. For those cases which have
ruled on this issue, see Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (government
must devise alternative to social security numbers for those who object to such numbers
as the "mark of the beast"); Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1979) (government's interest in comprehensive numbering system for AFDC benefits is
compelling and unachievable by less restrictive means, and thus overcomes "incidental
infringement" of plaintiff's belieO.
23. See text accompanying note 21, supra.
24. The court stated that "[t]he existence of a longstanding philosophical belief
which has only recently, and to the claimant's advantage, taken on theological overtones
could certainly give rise to reasonable suspicion of dissimulation." 658 F.2d at 684.
25. 652 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby, J.; the other panel members were
Fletcher, J., and Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (rehearing and rehearing en bane denied, Nov.
16, 1981).
26. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It shall be unlawful employment prac-
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an attorney's fees award as the "prevailing party", even though
their request for damages had been denied by the Supreme
Court.n
The class action suit alleged unlawful gender discrimination
in the Department's requirement that female employees make
larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees.1S
The plaintiffs were awarded injunctive relief and, upon remand,
attorney's fees le pursuant to section 706(k) of Title VII.80
Defendants contended that the award was improper because
plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed. Their argument was
based on the premise that section 706(k) authorizes attorney's
fees for the prevailing party, and since plaintiffs were denied
damages, they could not be the prevailing party.81 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this claim and held that the plaintiffs were the
prevailing party as long as they succeeded in establishing a "significant issue in litigation which achieved . . . the benefit which
the [plaintiff] sought in bringing the suit. "Ill The court found
that by proving discrimination and securing an injunction, the
plaintiff had satisfied this two part test. 88
In determining the amount of the award, the court found
tice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 78 Stat. 225, 253 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976».
27. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
The Court upheld plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, but denied the claim for back pay
because of the drastic effect it would have on pension funds. rd. at 722.
28. Although the monthly benefits for men and women were equal, the Department
determined that its women employees, on the average, will live longer than its male employees. Since the cost of a pension for a woman was greater, the Department required
its female employees to make monthly contributions to the fund which were 14.84%
higher than the contributions of comparable male employees. rd. at 705.
29. 652 F.2d at 906.
30. Section 706(k) of Title VII provides: "In any action or proceeding under this
title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...." See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
31. 652 F.2d at 906-07. Although the case was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980), the court noted that this section was patterned after section 706(k) of
Title VII. Thus, either provision was applicable. 652 F.2d at 907 n.1.
32. 652 F.2d at 907, citing Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1980);
Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980).
33. 652 F.2d at 907-09.
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that no fees may be awarded for time spent preparing unrelated
claims dismissed by the district court.34 However, plaintiffs were
entitled to an award for all time spent in pursuit of their remedy
for gender discrimination, even though it included time spent on
unsuccessful, but related, issues. 311
In Bartholomew v. Watson,38 however, the Ninth Circuit rejected an award "for all time expended" on a civil rights suit and
held that the proper amount of attorney's fees should be a reasonable amount for services performed on the prevailing issues. 3'
In Bartholomew, prison inmates filed complaints for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that practices of the Oregon
Corrections Division had violated their civil rights.38 The parties
agreed to a stay in the district court pending a state court determination as to whether the challenged procedures complied with
subsequent state legislation governing such procedures. Following a state court ruling in favor of the defendants,39 plaintiffs
filed the action in district court and obtained some, although not
all, of the relief they sought. 40
Attorney's fees were awarded to the plaintiffs under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.41 Included in
the award were fees for services performed in the state court
proceedings. The district court also awarded the full amount
claimed by plaintiffs' attorneys even though they had not pre34. [d. at 909.
35. [d. The plaintiffs made claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
section 1983 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, and the California Constitution. They prevailed only on the Title
VII claim. [d. at 906.
36. 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alcaron, J.; the other panel members were
Kennedy, J. and Copple, D. J., sitting by designation).
37. [d. at 914-15.
38. The plaintiffs brought their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation. . . subjects
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured ... for redress."
39. Bonney v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 16 Or. App. 509, 519 P.2d 383, aff'd, 270
Or. 79, 526 P.2d 1020 (1974).
40. See Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F. Supp. 223 (D. Or. 1979).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
. . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
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vailed on all the issues. The award for work performed in the
state court was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that
such an award furthers the legislative purpose of attorney's fees
in civil rights cases. 411 However, while the Ninth Circuit panel
agreed that plaintiffs were the "prevailing parties",43 it limited
the award to time spent only on the prevailing issues. 44
In Thornberry v. Delta Airlines,4G the Ninth Circuit affirmed an attorney's fee award which had resulted in a settlement of a Title VII complaint. 48 To determine the amount of the
section 706(k) award, the court relied upon Manhart in holding
that the award could not be deemed excessive because it included fees for time spent in preparing claims which were dismissed by the district court.47
The action in Thornberry alleged that the defendant had a
discriminatory employment structure. 48 The defendant agreed to
a settlement which included a monetary award for the individual
plaintiffs and increased promotional opportunities for women
employees. The panel found it acceptable to award attorney's
fees even though the plaintiff did not obtain every form of relief
sought. 49 It emphasized that the plaintiffs had pursued several
claims to remedy the same injury of gender discrimination.
Therefore, there was no cause to reduce the award to time spent
on the prevailing issues.
In Rivera v. City of Riverside,GO the Ninth Circuit upheld
42. 665 F.2d at 912·13. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), which dealt with section 706(k) of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In Gaslight, the Court held that the state proceedings were
included within the protection of section 706(k), streSBing the humanitarian and reme·
dial policies of Title VII and the statute's structure of cooperation between federal and
state enforcement authorities. [d. at 70·71. The Bartholomew court stated that the same
factors which apply in a section 706(k) award in state proceedings militate in favor of
awarding attorney's fees under section 1988. 665 F.2d at 913.
43. 665 F.2d at 914.
44. [d. at 915.
45. 676 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Farris and Nelson, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982)
(No. 82·192).
46. 676 F.2d at 1241.
47. [d. at 1243.
48. [d. at 1241.
49. [d. at 1243.
50. 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
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the district court's award of attorney's fees which included time
spent on unsuccessful claims to remedy a violation of plaintiffs'
civil rights. The suit was brought alleging civil rights and pendent state tort violations. III The plaintiffs were awarded damages
on the tort and section 1983 claims, as well as attorney's fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988.
In affirming the award, the panel relied upon Manhart's
"related claim to remedy the same injury" theme. It found this
approach consonant with Congress' unequivocal view that access
to the judicial system should be available to those who wish to
vindicate civil rights violations. 1I2 The panel expressed the view
that to reduce awards for unsuccessful related claims brought in
good faith would militate against that policy. liS
The common theme in civil rights cases in the Ninth Circuit
is that attorney's fees will be awarded to the prevailing party for
all time spent on successful issues. In instances where the plaintiff was only partially successful in obtaining the relief sought,
she will be considered the prevailing party for purposes of applying 42 U.S.C. section 1988 if she has been successful on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit
sought in bringing the suit.lI• In cases to remedy a single injury-e.g., discrimination-fees for time spent on related, but
unsuccessful, claims should be awarded notwithstanding the language in Bartholomew.
Although Bartholomew held that the plaintiffs should be
awarded attorney's fees only for time spent on the prevailing
"issues", the facts of the case indicate that, though the court
used the word "issues", it meant the word more in terms of
"claims for relief."1111 The plaintiffs in Bartholomew sought injunctive and declaratory relief for eleven separate claims of conHug and Tang, JJ.), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1982) (No.
82-156).
51. 679 F.2d at 796. Specifically, plaintiff alleged violations of the first, fourth, and
fourteenth amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 (1976). [d. at
796 n.l.
52. [d. at 797.
53. [d.
54. See supra text accompanying note 32.
55. See Twin City Sportservice v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 364 (1982).
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stitutional violations resulting from factually distinct acts by the
defendants, prevailing on four of them. lie Manhart, Rivera, and
Thornberry are factually distinguishable in that they involved
multiple, but related, forms of relief to remedy a single injury.
Thus, under section 1988, fees should be excluded for work performed only on unsuccessfully asserted claims for relief.

56. Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F. Supp. 223 (D. Or. 1979).
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